Love As Value

Love as Valuery. This type of love is divided into two subspecies:

1) the lover appreciates the subject of love as such, and love is understood as an evaluation of the quality of the subject's love in relation to the lover;

2) the subject becomes valuable to the lover because of his love for him, that is, in this case love is understood as the quality that the subject gives (gives) to the lover.

The first variant is followed by J. David Wellman, substantiating it with Kant's logic, which clearly distinguished the dignity from the price (in fact, Kant paid attention to the difference of means and purposes in love). Using the economic metaphor, one can assume that having a price means having a value that can be compared to the value of other things through price. This means that you can change your favorite without losing value. By contrast, to have dignity means to have such a value, which is meaningless to compare with another value. In other words, goods have prices, and people have dignity, which can not be compared. According to Kant, our dignity as individuals is rooted in our rational nature, our ability to be motivated by causes that we automatically include in defining our goals and responding to the values that we assimilate in the world. Accordingly, one of the manifestations of our rational nature is the reaction of respect for the dignity of other personalities.

What makes us respect the person? Wellman believes that this is what "restrains self-love," and thus prevents us from treating the subject of love as a means of achieving our goals. He believes that love resembles an answer to the dignity of the person, that is, It is dignity that is the object of our love, as well as its source. But love and respect are different types of response to the same value. Love does not hold back our narcissism. It rather curbs our emotions, i.e. Deprives us of emotional self-protection over others and thereby weakens us. This means that interest, attraction, sympathy, etc., which are usually associated with love, do not constitute love, but rather a normal consequence, and love can remain without them.

Wellman did not bother to answer, the consequence of which are the reactions listed by him (interest, etc.) and with what does love remain? (For some reason I would like to say: with a nose!) The main thing is his other: love - it's still an answer to the dignity, but not every person. ("Love is the optimal maximum response to the dignity of another.") Why is not everyone given this answer? Where is the limit of choice? Wellman believes that the choice happens when some people show the ability to express their dignity as a person, while others are able to appreciate this dignity, which, however, somehow turns into an emotional vulnerability. Thus, there is a correspondence between the behavior of the "subject of love" and the "evaluation" of this subject by lovers.